Trustee\u27s Power to Abandon: The Impact of Midlantic by Ablan, Roxanne
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 33
January 1988
Trustee's Power to Abandon: The Impact of
Midlantic
Roxanne Ablan
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open
Scholarship. For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roxanne Ablan, Trustee's Power to Abandon: The Impact of Midlantic, 33 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 255 (1988)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/10
TRUSTEE'S POWER TO ABANDON:
THE IMPACT OF MIDLANTIC
INTRODUCTION
Federal and state legislatures have enacted environmental legislation
to implement the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.' The legislation
generally provides two alternative procedures to achieve this goal.2
The government may issue an administrative order requiring the party
responsible3 to remedy the hazardous site.4 Alternatively, the govern-
1. Reports indicate that industry in the United States generates over 250 million
tons of hazardous waste per year. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Jan. 20, 1985, at 28, col.
1. There are approximately 50,000 mishandled waste facilities in the United States. See
United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
2. In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (hereinafter CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1983), to
remedy past improper disposal of hazardous waste. This article addresses specific pro-
visions of CERCLA to illustrate the environmental legislation discussed generally
throughout the article. CERCLA is an appropriate focus for the discussion because
most state legislation closely mirrors CERCLA. The reader, however, should consult
the statutes of the particular state in interest.
Congress also enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 1976 to regu-
late all facilities that transport, generate, or dispose of a certain amount of hazardous
waste. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
3. CERCLA imposes strict liability on four categories of persons: (1) the owner or
operator of a facility, (2) the owner or operator of the facility at the time of the hazard-
ous substance's disposal, (3) any person who arranged for disposal, treatment, or trans-
port of the hazardous substance at the facility, and (4) any person who accepted the
hazardous substance for transport to the facility selected by such person. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(l)-(4). See State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.
1985) (holding the current owner of a waste facility strictly liable under CERCLA).
The definition of "owner and operator" exempts persons who, without participating
in the management of a facility, have the indicia of ownership primarily to protect their
security interest in the property. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1983). See infra note 28 and
accompanying text.
CERCLA defines "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, partner-
ship, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State,
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ment may clean up hazardous sites' and seek recovery from the re-
sponsible parties for government costs incurred.6 The legislation
contemplates that persons responsible for a hazardous site will pay for
its cleanup.7 The costs of such a cleanup are substantial8 and some-
times result in responsible parties seeking refuge from liability in bank-
ruptcy.9 When this occurs, the environmental statutes directly conflict
with the federal Bankruptcy Code.1" In Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection," the Supreme
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a state, or any interstate body." 42
U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1983).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1983).
5. CERCLA creates a $1.6 billion superfund to finance emergency assistance and
containment actions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-9633 (1983). CERCLA section 9604 author-
ized the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA) to remove and remedy
any release or threatened release of any hazardous substance into the environment
which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare.
42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1983). To authorize the use of the Superfund, response action must
be in accord with the National Contingency Plan (hereinafter NCP). Id. The EPA
promulgated the NCP to effectuate the response powers and responsibilities created by
CERCLA. 400 C.F.R. 300 (1985). States acting in accordance with the NCP may also
clean up a hazardous waste site and seek reimbursement from CERCLA's Superfund.
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1983). President Reagan recently signed a bill appropriating $9
billion to continue Superfund for the next five years. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 19,
1986, at 7A, col. 3.
6. See supra note 3. Responsible parties are also liable for "any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency
plan" and "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from [a haz-
ardous substance] release." 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)(C) (1983).
7. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
8. The average expenditure per Superfund site nears $12 million. 49 Fed. Reg.
40,320, 40,325 (1984).
9. One writer suggests that environmental cleanup obligations make bankruptcy a
"virtual necessity." 15 ENvTL. L. REP. 10168, 10169 (1985). "When a company faces
environmental liabilities that are grossly out of proportion to the size of the business or
unanticipated given the nature of the business, it has little choice but to seek shelter in
bankruptcy." Id.
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982). The Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter Code) is
partly designed to provide individual debtors in bankruptcy a fresh start by discharging
all debts arising before bankruptcy. The Code also provides for the equitable distribu-
tion of the bankrupt's assets among creditors. On the other hand, legislatures designed
environmental legislation to protect the public health and environment by requiring
responsible parties to clean up hazardous waste sites. Additionally, the legislation seeks
rapid recovery of response costs that the government incurs so as to finance the cleanup
of other hazardous dumpsites.
11. 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
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Court held that bankruptcy trustees cannot abandon property in con-
travention of state environmental statutes. 12 A bankruptcy court may
authorize abandonment only after the court formulates conditions that
adequately protect the public health and safety.13
This article first discusses the abandonment power and how its exer-
cise may circumvent environmental legislation. 4 Next, the article crit-
ically reviews the Midlantic decision. 5 Finally, the article discusses
the practical impact of Midlantic on the abandonment power where
environmental liability exists.' 6
I. TRUSTEE ABANDONMENT POWERS
Courts recognized a trustees' ability to abandon property17 prior to
congressional codification of the abandonment power in the 1978
Bankruptcy Code.' 8 This judicially created power permits trustees to
abandon any property of the bankrupt's estate deemed harmful to the
estate.' 9 This property may be so heavily encumbered or extremely
costly to preserve that the property is valueless to the estate. 20 Al-
lowing trustees to abandon burdensome property benefits the estate's
creditors and furthers the primary purpose of a bankruptcy liquida-
tion.2' Funds that a trustee would otherwise use to administer value-
12. 106 S. Ct. at 762.
13. Id. See infra notes 65 and 66 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Section I. This article is limited to Chapter 7 liquidation'proceedings.
Section 959(b) of the Code requires trustees to act in accordance with state environmen-
tal laws during a Chapter 11 reorganization. See infra notes 59, 60 and accompanying
text.
15. See infra Section II.
16. See infra Section III.
17. See, e.g., Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 602-03 (1937) (abandonment is the
release from the debtor's estate of property previously included in that estate).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
19. See 4A W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY para. 70.42 at 502-04 & n.4
(14th ed. 1978) (citing cases) [hereinafter COLLIER).
20. See id.
21. The overriding purpose of bankruptcy liquidation is the expeditious reduction of
the debtor's property to money for an equitable distribution to creditors. See Kothe v.
R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227 (1930); COLLIER, supra, note 18, para. 70.42 at
502. "Forcing the trustee to administer burdensome property would contradict this
purpose, slowing the administration of the estate and draining its assets." Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755, 763 (1986) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
1988]
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less property are instead distributed to creditors.2 2
The trustee may abandon the property to any party with a posses-
sory interest, such as a debtor or a lien creditor entitled to possession.2 3
After abandonment, the property no longer belongs to the estate.2 4
When an environmental cleanup order confronts the estate, the trustee
may seek to abandon the property to avoid the cleanup obligation and
expense. 21 If abandonment occurs, 26 the government is left with either
a responsible debtor financially incapable of cleaning up the hazardous
22. Administrative expenses include "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of
preserving the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). Administrative expenses include, for
example, the cost of liquidating property of the estate for distribution to the creditors.
Administrative expenses have priority over general unsecured claims in the distribution
of the estate's assets. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
23. Section 554 does not itself specify to whom title to the abandoned property
passes. The legislative history states that abandonment may be to any party with a
possessory interest in the abandoned property. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 92 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5878.
24. See supra note 17.
25. See In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 284 (Bankr. Ohio 1985)
(prohibiting abandonment of contaminated drums as a means to escape CERCLA
liability).
26. Arguably, abandonment of contaminated property does not sever liability for
the hazardous waste from the estate, at least not under CERCLA. Although the prop-
erty is the source of the estate's liability, the estate's liability cannot be transferred with
title to the property. The estate, once an owner or operator of a facility, is liable under
CERCLA § 9607(a). See supra note 3. Subsequent abandonment of the source of liabil-
ity cannot transfer the estate's liability. CERCLA § 9607(e)(1) (1983) renders ineffec-
tive any ostensible transfers of liability. See TP. Long Chemical, 45 Bankr. at 284-85;
see 15 ENvTI. L. REP., supra note 9, at 10181 (stating that abandonment does not
necessarily transfer liability). See infra notes 73 to 79 and accompanying text.
The analysis may be different, however, with state environmental statutes that lack
the extensive scope of liability sanctioned by CERCLA. The Supreme Court's earlier
brief discussion of abandoning hazardous waste indicated that a trustee could abandon
property to avoid the estate's environmental obligations. The Court stated:
After notice and hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is
burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate. Such
abandonment is to the person having the possessory interest in the property.... If
the site at issue were [the debtor's] property, the trustee would shortly determine
whether it was of value to the estate. If the property was worth more than the
costs of bringing it into compliance with state law, the trustee would undoubtedly
sell it for its net value, and the buyer would clean up the property, in which event
whatever obligation [the debtor] might have had to clean up the property would
have been satisfied. If the property were worth less than the cost of cleanup, the
trustee would likely abandon it to its prior owner, who would have to comply with
the state environmental law to the extent of his or its ability.
Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 711 n.12 (1985) (citations omitted).
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property27 or a party without legal responsibility for the cleanup. 28
27. If the trustee abandons the property to an individual debtor, the debtor will
receive the property discharged from pre-petition environmental debts. Bankruptcy dis-
charges all individual debts or liabilities on a claim that arose before bankruptcy. See 11
U.S.C. § 727(b) (1979). Thus, if the government cleans up a hazardous site before the
debtor petitions for liquidation, the debtor's subsequent petition discharges the debt to
the government. Similarly, a recent Supreme Court decision held that a cleanup order
may be an obligation to pay money which therefore constitutes an obligation discharge-
able in bankruptcy. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985) (holding a cleanup order
reduced to a monetary obligation where appointment of a receiver before bankruptcy
divested the debtor of any assets available to clean up the site); United States v. Robin-
son, 46 Bankr. 136 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) (holding compliance with a court order
that costs money a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy). But see United States v. ILCO,
Inc., 48 Bankr. 1016 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985) (rejecting the argument that an order
requiring the expenditure of money is a money judgment prohibited by the automatic
stay).
A claim that arises after the debtor petitions for bankruptcy liquidation is a post-
petition debt. A post-petition debt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Similarly, an
order requiring cleanup may survive bankruptcy. Id. Under these circumstances, the
government may proceed against the individual debtor after bankruptcy. Most individ-
uals, however, are unlikely to possess sufficient funds to make a significant contribution
to a cleanup. See supra note 8.
A discussion of the issues concerning when a claim arises is beyond the scope of this
article. For a further discussion of these issues as they relate to environmental liability,
see 15 ENVTL. L. REP., supra note 9, at 10175-77.
Non-individual debts are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The 1978 Bankruptcy
Code eliminated the provision for discharge of non-individual debts. 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a)(1) (1979); see S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5884. Thus, although a government claim
for reimbursement and an order requiring cleanup will survive a corporate bankruptcy,
the liquidated corporation claim will not.
28. If the trustee abandons the property to a lien creditor, in most instances, the lien
creditor will not qualify as a responsible party liable for cleanup. See supra note 2. This
result is certain to occur where the government already cleaned up the hazardous site
and the lien creditor received the property free from contamination. The government
can only seek recovery from the lien creditor if the lien creditor previously participated
in operating the hazardous site. See United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op.
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1985) (participation in the daily operations of a waste site is a prereq-
uisite to a secured creditor's liability under CERCLA). A lien creditor may also incur
liability for cleanup if the government removes hazardous waste from the property after
the lien creditor becomes the owner of the property. See United States v. Maryland
Bank & Trust, 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986) (holding mortgagee-turned-owner who
possessed title to property for one year before discovery of hazardous waste liable for
cleanup costs); but see Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. (holding mortgagee-turned-owner
who promptly resells contaminated property exempt from liability under CERCLA);
T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. 278 (bank repossessing contaminated drums pursuant to its secur-
ity agreement would be exempt from liability under CERCLA); 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(20)(A) (1983) (definition of "owner and operator" exempts persons who, with-
out participating in the management of a facility, hold indicia of ownership primarily to
protect their security interest in the facility). A prudent creditor, however, will aban-
1988]
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Thus, abandonment is an effective means for the estate to avoid envi-
ronmental cleanup expenses, rendering hazardous waste cleanup both a
government responsibility and expense.
Only three pre-Code decisions limit the trustee's common law aban-
donment power when it conflicts with legitimate federal or state inter-
ests.29 Congress codified the abandonment power in section 554 of the
1978 Code, but failed to limit the trustee's power to abandon.30 Sec-
don a lien on contaminated property to avoid the possibility of environmental liability.
For a discussion of lender liability and how lenders can protect against risks of environ-
mental liability, see Cohen, Hazardous Waste: A Threat to the Lender's Environment, 19
U.C.C.L.J. 99 (1986); Burcat, Environmental Liability of Creditors: Open Season on
Banks, Creditors, and other Deep Pockets, 103 BANKING L.J. 509 (1986).
29. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952), the Fourth Circuit
held that the bankruptcy trustee could not abandon several barges anchored in Balti-
more's harbor. Id. at 289-90. If the court permitted abandonment, the barges would
obstruct navigable waters in violation of federal law. Id. at 290. The court explained
that the judge-made rule must succumb to a federal statute enacted to protect the safety
of navigation. Id. The court required the trustee to remove the barges at the estate's
expense. Id.
In Chicago Rapid Transit Co. v. Sprague, 129 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
683 (1942), the Seventh Circuit conditioned the trustee's abandonment power on com-
pliance with state law. Id. at 6. The debtor railroad was a public utility subject to state
regulations. Id. at 3. The regulations limited the railway's power to abandon service
without state approval. Id. The court held that the trustee of the debtor transit com-
pany could not abandon the services of the railway line because local law required its
continued operation. Id. at 6. Although the court ordered continued operation of the
services, it permitted abandonment of the burdensome lease of the line from the inter-
state authority. Id.
In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 B.C.D. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974), found no federal or
state laws which prohibited abandonment of the manholes, vents, and steampipes the
trustee sought to abandon. Id. at 279-80. The court held, however, that abandonment
would pose a continued danger to the public health and safety. Id. at 280. The court
required the trustee to seal the manholes, vents, and pipes before abandoning them. Id.
The trustee charged the costs of securing the property to the debtor's estate. Id.
See also In re Adelphi Hospital Corp., 579 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a
trustee could abandon medical records regardless of a state law requiring insolvent hos-
pitals to retain them).
30. Congress limited the abandonment power only to the property's value to the
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982 & Supp. 1986). Justice Rehnquist explained that the
absolute language of section 554 "suggests that a trustee's power to abandon is limited
only by considerations of the property's value to the estate. It makes no mention of
other factors to be balanced or weighed and permits no easy inference that Congress
was concerned about state environmental regulations." Midlantic National Bank v.
New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755, 763-64 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). See also In re T.P. Long Chemical Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 284 (Bankr. Ohio
1985) (except for procedural requirements, nothing in the text of section 554 appears to
prohibit abandonment); Note, Cleaning Up in Bankruptcy: Curbing Abuse of the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Code by Industrial Polluters, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 870, 883 (1985).
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tion 554 simply states that after notice and hearing "the trustee may
abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or
that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.",
3 1
II. THE MIDLANTIC DECISION
In Midlantic the Supreme Court decided whether a bankruptcy
trustee may abandon property and avoid responsibility for cleanup
under state environmental laws.32 The bankruptcy trustee in a liquida-
tion proceeding sought to abandon waste oil facilities in New York3 3
and New Jersey.34 Both facilities were contaminated3 5 and required a
cleanup to comply with state law.36 All parties to the liquidation pro-
31. I1 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982 & Supp. 1986). Section 554 requires notice and a hear-
ing before the bankruptcy court may authorize abandonment. Id. This procedure pro-
vides the debtor and creditors of the estate an opportunity to be heard on the question
of abandonment. See generally In re Williamson, 13 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. Ga. 1981); In
re Robinson, 12 Bankr. 591 (Bankr. Ga. 1981); In re Hawkins, 8 Bankr. 637 (Bankr.
Ga. 1981); In re Malcolm, 48 F. Supp. 675 (E.D. Ill. 1943); Felty v. Olwan, 284 Ky.
762, 145 S.W.2d 1059 (1940). Section 554(b) also authorizes a "party in interest" to
petition the bankruptcy court to compel the trustee to abandon the property. 11 U.S.C.
§ 554(b) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
32. 106 S. Ct. 755, 757 (1986).
33. The debtor, Quanta Resources Corporation (Quanta), owned and operated the
waste oil storage and processing facility in Long Island City, New York. The site con-
tained fuel storage tanks holding more than 500,000 gallons of waste oil and other
chemicals. At least 70,000 gallons were contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), which are extremely hazardous chemicals. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739
F.2d 912, 913 (3d Cir. 1984).
34. Quanta leased and operated the facility in Edgewater, New Jersey where it
processed and resold waste oil and oil sludge. Quanta operated the site under tempo-
rary operating authorities that the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion issued Quanta. The temporary operating authorities prohibited Quanta from
accepting PCB-contaminated oil. Id. at 928. "
35. Quanta accepted large quantities of highly contaminated oil at the New Jersey
facility. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) found
PCB-contaminated oil at the New Jersey site in violation of the temporary operating
authority.
36. After discovering Quanta's violation, NJDEP ordered cessation of Quanta's
New Jersey operations and the two parties commenced negotiations regarding cleanup.
106 S. Ct. at 757. Before the negotiations concluded, however, Quanta petitioned for
reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. NJDEP immediately
issued an administrative order requiring Quanta to cease operations, close the facility
within one year, and clean up all hazardous materials. Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d at
928. Quanta then converted the reorganization proceeding to a liquidation proceeding
under Chapter 7 of the Code. Id. After Quanta filed for bankruptcy, an inspection of
the New York facility also revealed the necessity of a cleanup at the New York site. 106
S. Ct. at 758.
1988]
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ceeding agreed that the sites were "burdensome" and of "inconsequen-
tial value to the estate.",
3 7
The bankruptcy and district courts approved abandonment of the
sites.3 ' The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed, 9 holding that section 554 fails to supersede enforcement of
state public health and safety laws.40
The Court's five to four decision,41 authored by Justice Powell, held
37. 106 S. Ct. at 758. The trustee's notice of intent to abandon the New York
faclity asserted that the expenditures needed to bring the facility into compliance with
state law would render the property burdensome to the estate. Quanta Resources, 739
F.2d at 914. The City and State of New York opposed abandonment, claiming that
abandonment constitutes disposal of hazardous wastes in violation of state law. See
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 71-2702 (McKinney Supp. 1982). New York also
claimed that abandonment would create a continuing violation of the state's hazardous
waste storage laws. Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d at 914.
NJDEP also objected to the proposed abandonment because it would violate state law
and threaten public health and safety. Id. at 928. The oil at the New Jersey site re-
mained in leaking and insecure tanks that created a danger of spillage into the Hudson
River. Id. New York law prohibits intentional or unintentional releasing, spilling, or
leaking of hazardous substances that may drain into state waters. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:10-23.llb(h) and § 58:10-23.11c (West 1982). Moreover, NJDEP argued that the
estate possessed sufficient funds to remedy the hazards. Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d at
928.
38. After the trustee abandoned the New York site, New York cleaned up the facil-
ity with the exception of the contaminated subsoil. 106 S. Ct. at 758. The cleanup cost
New York approximately $2.5 million. Id. The bankruptcy court did not require the
trustee to secure the abandoned property in New York or New Jersey. Minor measures
such as security fencing, drainage and diking repairs, sealing deteriorating tanks, and
removal of explosive agents, could have minimized the imminent danger of the sites.
Instead, the trustee's abandonment at both the facilities aggravated the existing dangers
by discontinuing security measures to prevent public entry, vandalism, and fire. Id. at
758, n.3.
39. In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984) (appeal of the
NJDEP), cert. granted sub nom., Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of
Envtl. Protection, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912
(3d Cir. 1984) (appeal of the State and City of New York), cert. granted sub nom.,
O'Neill v. City of New York, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985).
40. 739 F.2d at 921. The Third Circuit agreed with New York's argument that
abandonment constitutes disposal of hazardous waste:
If trustees in bankruptcy are to be permitted to dispose of hazardous wastes under
the cloak of the abandonment power, compliance with environmental protection
laws will be transformed into governmental cleanup by default. It cannot be said
that the bankruptcy laws were intended to work such a radical change in the na-
ture of local public health and safety regulation. ...
739 F.2d at 921. See supra note 37.
41. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated the cases. Midlantic
National Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Protection, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985); O'Neill
v. City of New York, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985).
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that trustees may not abandon property in contravention of state laws
reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identi-
fied hazards.4 2 A bankruptcy court may authorize abandonment only
after formulating conditions to adequately protect the public from im-
minent and identifiable harm.4 3
The Court first addressed the unrestricted language of section 554
and its scant legislative history.' The majority primarily relied on the
three pre-Code decisions that restrict the trustee's common law aban-
donment power.4 5 Powell characterized these opinions as "well-recog-
nized restrictions" on the abandonment power.4 6 Consistent with this
characterization, he assumed that congressional codification of the
abandonment power includes prohibiting abandonment in contraven-
tion of specific state and federal laws.47 The opinion reasoned that a
congressional change in the common law restriction would have been
explicitly stated.4 8
Three aspects of Justice Powell's statutory interpretation are ques-
tionable. First, the three earlier decisions are not "well-recognized re-
strictions., 49 Second, the conclusion that Congress knew about the
decisions is doubtful. Third, assuming congressional awareness of the
pre-Code decisions, the more appropriate construction is that Congress
42. 106 S. Ct. 755, 762 (1986).
43. Id. at 762, 763 & n.9.
44. The legislative history of section 554 is de minimus. See S. REP. No. 95-989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 93 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5879.
45. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
46. 106 S. Ct. at 759.
47. Id. at 759. Compare Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) (overrul-
ing three prior judicial interpretations of congressional statutes, notwithstanding Con-
gress' intervening re-enactment of the statutes without any changes rejecting the earlier
interpretations).
48. Justice Powell explained that:
[t]he Court has followed this rule with particular care in construing the scope of
bankruptcy codifications. If Congress wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary
exemption from non-bankruptcy law, "the intention would be clearly expressed,
not left to be collected or inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in
administering the estate of the bankrupt."
Id. (quoting Swarts v. Hammer, 194 U.S. 441, 444 (1904)).
49. Justice Rehnquist responded to Powell's characterization of the three decisions,
stating: "[The characterization] rests on a misreading of the three pre-Code cases, the
elevation of that misreading into a 'well-recognized' exception to the abandonment
power, and the unsupported assertion that Congress must have meant to codify the
exception (or something like it)." Id. at 763 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19881
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intentionally omitted the judicial limitation. Since the Code is a com-
prehensive statute, it is unlikely that Congress would omit a simple
sentence incorporating "well-recognized restrictions" and leave further
interpretation to the Supreme Court.5 °
The Court also relied on other bankruptcy provisions that Congress
expressly limited, concluding that section 554 does not pre-empt all
state laws. Particularly, Justice Powell focused on an explicit statutory
exception to the automatic stay51 that permits the government to en-
force nonmonetary judgments against the debtor's estate. 2 The legis-
lative history specifically exempts from the stay any government action
relating to environmental protection. 3 In light of such express limita-
tions on other bankruptcy provisions, Justice Powell assumed that
50. According to Powell's construction, Congress must assume the role of a court
watcher and promulgate statutes that include instructions specifying what Congress
does not intend to legislate. See Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the
Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 IND. L. REv. 515, 517 (1982)
("the words of a statute-and not the legislators' intent as such-must be the crucial
elements both in the statute's legal force and in its proper interpretation") (emphasis in
original).
51. The Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy oper-
ates as a stay of:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, or a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of
the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against the property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before commencement of the case under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1), (2) (1982 & Supp. 1986). The automatic stay relieves debtors
from the claims of their creditors and prevents depletion of the bankrupt's assets before
an equitable distribution among the creditors.
52. The exceptions to the automatic stay include: (1) the commencement or contin-
uation of actions or proceedings by governmental units to enforce the regulatory or
police powers and (2) the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment,
obtained in an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce the regulatory or
police power. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4), (5) (1982). See United States v. ILCO, Inc., 48
Bankr. 1016 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985) (holding a cleanup order is not subject to the
automatic stay).
53. The legislative history provides:
Thus, where a government unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of
fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar policy or
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such law, the action
or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay.
S. REP. No. 95-989 at 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5838;
H. REP. No. 95-595 at 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6299.
(emphasis added).
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Congress intended to include the common law restriction on the aban-
donment power.54 He dismissed the argument that Congress could
limit the abandonment power if it desired,5 5 as it did with. respect to
other bankruptcy provisions.56 Instead, Justice Powell used the judici-
ary as a legislative body, explaining that it was unnecessary for Con-
gress to expressly limit section 554 because the judiciary already did
so.
57
Finally, the majority posited that section 959(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code supports the conclusion that section 554 fails to pre-empt state
law. 8 Section 959(b) directs trustees to manage and operate the es-
tate's property in accordance with state law.5 9 Abandonment, how-
ever, does not constitute management or operation, and the majority
opinion failed to clarify what application, if any, section 959(b) has to
section 554.'
Midlantic restricts the abandonment power and compromises a
bankruptcy liquidation policy to accommodate state environmental
54, 106 . Ct. at 760.
55. Id. at 761.
56. See. e.g., section 1170(a)(2) of the Code governing abandonment of railroad
lines. II US.C. § 1170(a)(2) (1982). Section 1170 permits abandonment of a railroad
line if the abandonment is "consistent with the public interest." Id. (emphasis added).
57. Justice Powell explained that it was unnecessary for Congress to expressly limit
the abandonment power because the judiciary already "firmly established" the excep-
tions. Id. In contrast to existing judicial limts on the abandonment power, Congress
intended to overrule pre-Code judicial decisions that broadened the automatic stay to
foreclose enforcement of state anti-pollution laws. Id. But see supra note 54 and ac-
companying text.
58. 106 . Ct. at 761.
5). Section 959(b) provides in relevant part:
* a trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending in any court of
the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the
property in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager according to the
requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is situated, in the
same manner that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in pos-
session thereof,
60. In some liquidation proceedings, section 959(b) applies if the court authorizes
the trustee to operate the debtor's business. See 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (1982).
Justice Powell's own uncertainty as to the application of section 959(b) to section 554
is evident from his following statement:
Even though § 959(b) does not directly apply to an abandonment under § 554(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code-and therefore does not delimit the precise conditions on an
abandonment-the section nevertheless supports our conclusion that Congress did
not intend for the Bankruptcy Code to pre-empt all state laws that otherwise con-
strain the exercise of a trustee's powers.
106 S. Ct. at 762.
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laws.6 Although a safe environment is unquestionably an important
public policy, the Supreme Court's resolution of how to attain a safe
environment is suspect.
III. LIMITATIONS ON MIDLANTIC
The Midlantic decision is a disappointing answer to the complex is-
sues raised when a responsible party faced with cleanup obligations pe-
titions for liquidation under Chapter 7. Although the decision limits a
trustee's power to abandon hazardous property, the opinion fails to
delineate exactly what a trustee must do before a bankruptcy court
may authorize abandonment. The Court left open questions such as:
what state laws or regulations a trustee must comply with before a
bankruptcy court may authorize abandonment; whether a complete
cleanup of contaminated property is a prerequisite to abandonment; if
the government cleans up contaminated property and then seeks reim-
bursement from the estate, whether the Midlantic decision prohibits
abandonment as a means to avoid liability; whether the estate's funds
will finance required remedial measures. These issues are the focus of
the following sections.
A. Adequate Measures to Protect Public Health and Safety
Midlantic requires bankruptcy courts to formulate conditions that
adequately protect the public health and safety.62 This command will
cause controversy regarding what measures adequately protect the
public welfare. In Midlantic, abandonment of two facilities aggravated
already existing dangers. The trustee removed guard service from the
facilities, thus creating the additional danger of public entry and in-
jury."3 At a minimum, courts may interpret Midlantic to prohibit
61. Justice Powell found Congress' interest in protecting the environment manifest
in the two congressional statutes regulating hazardous substances. See supra note 2.
Relying on Congress' expressed concern over hazardous waste, Justice Powell refused
to presume that Congress implicitly overruled "longstanding restrictions" on the aban-
donment power. 106 S. Ct. at 762. The dissenting opinion countered that "[i]f these
statutes operated to bar abandonment here-something neither respondents nor the
Court suggests-then this might be a different case.... But the statutes do not bar
abandonment, and the majority's reference to their obvious concern over the risks of
storing hazardous substances is little more than make-weight." Id. at 764-65, n.3. (cita-
tion omitted).
62. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 38. In addition to removing 24-hour guard service, the trustee
shut down a fire-suppression system at the New York facility. 106 S. Ct. at 758,
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abandonment when it creates additional danger to the public.6 4 Be-
yond this threshold, the command of Midlantic is ambiguous.
The decision holds that abandonment may not contravene state laws
reasonably designed to protect the public from identified hazards. 6 A
footnote adds the limitation that the abandonment power may be lim-
ited only by laws or regulations reasonably designed to protect the pub-
lic health or safety from "imminent and identifiable harm."66 When a
hazardous site presents an imminent and identifiable harm, the bank-
ruptcy judge must determine which state laws or regulations a trustee
must comply with before court authorization of abandonment. 67 Re-
medial measures short of a total cleanup which eliminate imminent and
64. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, would accept a narrow condition on
the abandonment power "where abandonment by the trustee itself might create a genu-
ine emergency that the trustee would be uniquely able to guard against." In any other
situation, Justice Rehnquist would require only that the trustee notify the appropriate
authorities to allow those authorities to take remedial measures. He reasoned that this
procedure is consistent with the Code and also furthers the state's interest. He stated,
"[i]t advances the States' interest in protecting the public health and safety, and, unlike
the rather uncertain exception to the abandonment power propounded by the Court, at
the same time allows for the orderly liquidation and distribution of the estate's assets."
Id. at 767 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 762.
66. Id. at 762, n.9. (emphasis added). The majority's holding, in full context, also
reveals uncertainty as to the scope of the Midlantic holding:
Accordingly, without reaching the question whether certain state laws imposing
conditions on abandonment may be so onerous as to interfere with the bankruptcy
adjudication itself, we hold that a trustee may not abandon property in contraven-
tion of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public
health or safety from identified hazards.
Id. at 762. The footnote to this holding reads in full:
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the trustee by § 554 is a nar-
row one. It does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate future violation of
such laws that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment power is not to be
fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public
health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm.
Id. at n.9.
67. In Midlantic, hundreds of thousands of gallons of highly toxic waste oil re-
mained in deteriorating containers causing imminent risks of explosion, fire, water con-
tamination, natural resource destruction, injury, genetic damages, and death through
personal contact. The bankruptcy court failed to require the trustee to abate these im-
minent dangers. After abandonment, both facilities remained a high risk to public
health and safety. Id. at 758, n.3, (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
4, 23).
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority failed to identify those state
laws "reasonably calculated to protect the public health or safety from imminent and
identifiable harm," thus, a trustee must speculate as to which state laws he or she must
follow. 106 S. Ct. at 767 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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identifiable harm and adequately protect the public comply with the
Midlantic requirement. 68 If measures short of a total cleanup ade-
quately protect the public, the trustee can abandon the property with-
out the greater financial burden of a complete cleanup. Bankruptcy
courts should adopt this approach to achieve a more equitable resolu-
tion of the conflict between the abandonment power and environmental
laws. Such an approach protects the public from imminent harm and
allows the trustee to administer the bankrupt's estate with less delay
and to distribute more of the estate's assets to the debtor's creditors.69
If a court requires a complete cleanup of a contaminated site, state
environmental laws will completely obviate the abandonment power
and cripple the Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding. This result is unwar-
ranted in light of the language of section 55470 and the Bankruptcy
Code's supremacy over state law.7 Although the Midlantic majority
found that section 554 fails to pre-empt all state laws, the holding does
not sanction state environmental laws completely negating the trustee's
abandonment power.72 In the absence of express congressional intent,
courts should reconcile the operation of the Bankruptcy Code with en-
vironmental statutes, rather than subordinate the Code's provisions to
environmental legislation. A flexible analysis of which remedial meas-
ures adequately protect the public from imminent and identifiable
harm accommodates the policies underlying both the Bankruptcy Code
and environmental legislation.73
B. Midlantic's Impact on Cleanup and Cost Recovery Actions
When the government cleans up a hazardous site while it is in the
estate's possession, the trustee may subsequently seek to abandon the
property to escape the estate's reimbursement obligation.74 The
Midlantic decision fails to prohibit abandonment in this situation. The
68. Remedial measures, such as fencing, removal of explosive agents, and sealing
deteriorated tanks, could adequately protect the public health and safety from imminent
dangers. Id.
69. See supra note 21.
70. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
71. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2.
72. See supra note 66.
73. See supra note 10.
74. See In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 284 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1985) (trustee sought to abandon contaminated drums that were property of the estate
when the estate took remedial action to avoid its obligation to the EPA under
CERCLA).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/10
TRUSTEE'S POWER TO ABANDON
Court in Midlantic refused to extend its rationale to government
cleanup and cost recovery actions. If the government remedies the
hazardous site, subsequent abandonment will not threaten the public
with an imminent and identifiable harm.75 Statutory or regulatory pro-
visions requiring reimbursement protect the public purse instead of
protecting the public from imminent and identifiable harm.
The government may argue, however, that speedy cost recovery is
necessary to finance future cleanups of harmful sites. The majority
opinion foreclosed this argument.7 6 The Court stated that the limit on
abandonment "does not encompass a speculative or indeterminate fu-
ture violation of such laws that may stem from abandonment.,
77
Permitting abandonment in a government cleanup and cost recovery
action, however, will not necessarily prevent the government from ob-
taining reimbursement from the estate.7" Some of the expenses in-
curred by the government are costs the estate would bear following a
government cleanup order.7 9 If abandonment totally relieves the estate
of its reimbursement obligation, determining who pays for environ-
mental cleanup depends on which procedure the government employs.
To prevent this anomalous result, courts must render ineffective a
trustee's attempt to avoid or transfer the estate's liability. 0
C. Utilizing Estate Funds to Remedy Imminent Dangers
Prohibiting abandonment will remedy a hazardous site and ensure
compliance with environmental laws only if sufficient estate funds are
available to remedy the danger. The Court in Midlantic failed to dis-
cuss what part of the estate's funds will finance the remedial measures
required by the bankruptcy courts.8" Cleanup obligations must obtain
75. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
76. The Court prohibits abandonment to protect the public health and safety from
"identified" hazards only. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
78. See TP. Long, 45 Bankr. at 284 (holding that abandonment does not affect the
estate's liability under CERCLA). See also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
79. See TP. Long, 45 Bankr. at 287 (holding government removal of hazardous
wastes an obligation of the estate under CERCLA because the EPA discharged a "duty
of the trustee").
80. Applicable environmental statutes may already foreclose abandonment as a
means for the estate to avoid reimbursement obligations. See supra note 26 and accom-
panying text.
81. In Midlantic, New York sought reimbursement from the estate as an adminis-
trative expense. 106 S. Ct. at 758, n.2. New Jersey also sought to force the trustee to
remedy the New Jersey hazard with estate funds. 739 F.2d at 928. The majority re-
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priority over other claims against the estate to ensure that prohibiting
abandonment will remedy hazardous property. Otherwise, the prop-
erty will remain in the estate's possession as an imminent danger to the
public health and safety. 82
Thus, since the Court in Midlantic failed to address the issue of
cleanup cost priority, the decision leaves bankruptcy courts with few
choices to effectuate the command of the Midlantic majority. Courts
will undoubtedly follow earlier decisions that allow cleanup costs as an
administrative expense.8 3  The trustee pays administrative expenses
before the claims of unsecured creditors, but after those of the secured
creditors.8 4 This approach will result in cleanup by the estate, to the
detriment of unsecured creditors, rather than by the government.8 "
A greater problem arises when the funds available for administrative
expenses are insufficient to cover remedial cleanup costs.8 6 To date,
bankruptcy courts have refused to subordinate secured creditors'
claims to an estate's cleanup obligation. 7 Some states, however, do so
fused to address this issue, responding that the question was not before the Court. Id.
That question, however, is inseparable from the question the Court decided. The
Court's holding necessarily requires the trustee to spend estate funds. See 15 ENVTL. L.
REP., supra note 9, at 10181 (the Third Circuit assumes "that denying abandonment
would prevent or minimize the environmental hazard"). In sum, the Court prohibits
abandonment on the preliminary assumption that the estate must remedy the hazardous
site. Otherwise, there is no reason to prohibit abandonment.
82. See supra note 81.
83. See In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)
(holding that cleanup costs incurred by the EPA after the debtor files for bankruptcy
are recoverable from the bankrupt's estate as an administrative expense). See In re
Laurinburg Oil Co., No. B-84-001 1, slip op., (M.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 1984). But see In re
Stevens, 53 Bankr. 783 (Bankr. Maine 1985) (cleanup cost inherited by trustee is not an
administrative expense).
84. The Bankruptcy Code allows as an administrative expense "the actual necessary
costs and expenses of preserving the estate .... " 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (1982). Ad-
ministrative expenses received the first priority of payment out of the estate's unencum-
bered assets. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1982).
85. The court in T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 287, stated that it could:
sympathize with the creditors but finds that this is a risk which the creditors must
bear. Creditors must bear the risk of any enterprise. Congress has decided that
administrative expenses should be paid prior to other claims against the estate.
The estate cannot avoid its legal obligations merely by invoking concern for the
general creditors.
86. In TP. Long, the unencumbered assets of the estate were insufficient to cover
the cleanup costs and the EPA sought payment out of a bank's security interest on the
contaminated property. Id.
87. Section 506(c) of the Code allows recovery of administrative expenses from se-
cured creditors. The section represents an exception to the traditional rule that admin-
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through express superlien provisions creating statutory liens in favor of
the states for environmental cleanup costs. 88 Absent such legislation,
secured creditors are presently immune from government attempts to
recover cleanup costs. Unsecured creditors, however, remain unpro-
tected from this attack.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of policy, Midlantic represents the view that unsecured
creditors, rather than the government, must bear the risk of cleanup
when the responsible debtor petitions for bankruptcy. The Court effec-
tively places the financial burden of environmental cleanup on an un-
suspecting few when the responsible debtor liquidates in Chapter 7 and
escapes liability. For this reason, bankruptcy courts should interpret
Midlantic narrowly and require that the trustee expend only the funds
necessary to protect the public health and safety from imminent and
identifiable harm. Until Congress produces a legislative plan to resolve
the conflicts between the Bankruptcy Code and environmental legisla-
tion, courts must strive to reach an equitable result that accommodates
both legislative schemes.
Roxanne Ablan*
istrative expenses are not charged against secured creditors. The traditional rule exists
because trustees usually act for the benefit of general creditors. If the trustee acts for
the benefit of the secured creditors, however, the estate is not expected to bear the cost.
Thus, § 506(c) provides that "[t]he trustee may recover from property securing an al-
lowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expense of preserving, or dis-
posing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim." I1
U.SC § 506(c) (1982) (emphasis added). In T.P. Long, the court rejected the EPA's
claim that the expense fell within the § 506(c) exception because the bank would not
benefit as holder of the secured claim. See supra note 86. But see In re Berg Chemical
Co., No. 82-B 12052 (HB) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1984) (New York obtained a first
lien and superpriority over all debts, including existing liens, in the Berg bankruptcy
pursuant to an agreement in which it agreed to fund a hazardous cleanup at a Berg site).
88, These states include New Jersey, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. For a
discussion of these provisions and related issues, see Note, Priority Lien Statutes: The
State's Answer to Bankrupt Hazardous Waste Generators, 31 WASH. U. J. URB. & CON-
TEMP. L. 373 (1987).
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